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Wehren: Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Under Title VII: Garcia v. Elf Atoc
SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII:

GARCIA V. ELF ATOCHEM MARKS A
STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits sexual
harassment in the workplace.' Both women and men can bring a Title VII
action3 against either an individual supervisor or their employer.4 In most
cases of sexual harassment, the harasser and the victim are of the opposite

1. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1) as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). Title

VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . .. to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's. .. sex." Id.
2. LAWRENCE SOLOTOFF & HENRY S. KRAMER, SEXUAL DISCRmIINATION AND SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE § 3.04[3][a] (1994). See Showalter v. Allison Reed Group,
767 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (D.RI. 1991), affd on other grounds, 984 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1993)
("Title VII protects both males and females from sexual harassment."); Prescott v. Independent
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1549 (M.D. Ala. 1995) ("[Ilt is unquestioned that
Title VII prevents 'reverse discrimination' against men."). See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Service
Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977); Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins., 40 F.3d
796, 801-02 (6th Cir. 1994). See also Baskerville v. Culligan Intern. Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th
Cir. 1995); Henson v. City of Dundee 682 F.2d 897, 903 (1lth Cir. 1982); Pritchett v. Sizeler
Real Estate Management Co., No. Civ.A.93-2351, 1995 WL 241855, at *I (E.D. La. April 25,
1995): Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp 1100,
1103 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Polly v. Houston Lighting Co., 825 F. Supp. 135, 136-37 (S.D. Tex.
1993). See also Michelle R. Peirce, Note, Sexual Harassmentand Title VII-A Better Solution, 30
B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1087 (1989) (stating men can claim protection under Title VII based on
sexual harassment by women).
3. The following elements are required to prove a Title VII employment discrimination
claim:
(1) [Ihe plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie
case of the discrimination alleged; (2) if successful in making such a showing, the
burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for the plaintiff's discharge; (3) once the defendant articulates such a reason, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the reasons proffered by the defendant were
a mere pretext.
Roberts v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., No. 89-0822, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 890, at *6 (E.D. Penn. Jan.
25, 1991). Accord Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 250-52
(1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
4. One author summarizes the coverage of Title VII as follows:
The following organizations are covered by Title VII: (1) employers having
15 or more employees in industries affecting commerce; (2) state and local
governments; (3) labor organizations with 15 or more members in industries affecting
commerce; and (4) employment agencies. The class of potential plaintiffs is broader
than that of employees in the traditional sense. Potential defendants include individual
supervisors as well as employers.
HENRY H. PERRiTT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACrICE § 2.3 (3rd ed. 1992) (citations
omitted).
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sex.' There is no question that cross-gender sexual harassment6 is actionable
under Title VII. 7 Thus, Title VII prohibits sexual harassment either where
the harasser is male and the victim is female' or where the harasser is female
and the victim is male.9 However, the question that has yet to be resolved
is whether Title VII prohibits sexual harassment where the harasser and the
victim are the same gender.'0
The United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the question of12

whether same-gender sexual harassment" is actionable under Title VII.

Several federal courts have addressed this issue, but the results have been
Circuit is the only United States Court of
inconsistent. 3 To date, the Fifth
4
Appeals to rule on this issue.'

In Garcia v. Elf Atochem, 5 the Fifth Circuit held that same-gender
sexual harassment is not actionable under Title VII. 6 In Garcia, a male
employee sued his employer, alleging sexual harassment by his male

5. Janet Hughie Smith, Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: Some Guidelines For
Employers and Legal Update, C983 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 135, 144 (1995). See also Peirce, supra note
2, at 1071.
6. Cross-gender sexual harassment refers to sexual harassment involving a harasser and a
victim of the opposite sex.
7. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (recognizing an action under Title
VII for hostile environment sexual harassment where a female employee was sexually harassed
by her male supervisor); Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). See Hopkins v.
Baltimore Gas & Electric, 871 F. Supp. 822, 832. See also Smith, supra note 5, at 144.
8. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. 57.
9. See, e.g., Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins., 40 F.3d 796, 801-02 (6th Cir. 1994).
10. See Vandeventer v. Wabash National Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1180 (N.D. Ind. 1995)
("[Same-sex harassment] is still a murky area of the law.").
11. Same-gender sexual harassment refers to sexual harassment involving a harasser and a
victim of the same sex.
12. Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., No. Civ.A. 93-2351, 1995 WL 241855,
at *2 (E.D. La. 1995). See also Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric, 871 F. Supp. 822, 832
(D. Md. 1994) ("[The Supreme Court] did not, however, address the viability under Title VII of
a claim of same-gender sexual harassment.").
13. Pritchett, No. Civ.A. 93-2351, 1995 WL 241855, at *2 n.2. Compare Wright v.
Methodist Youth Services., 511 F. Supp. 307, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that discharge of a
male employee because he rejects homosexual advances made by his male supervisor is a
violation of Title VII) and Joyner v. AAA Cooper Trans., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala.
1983) ("[U]nwelcome homosexual harassment also states a violation of Title VII.") with
Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F, Supp. 1452 (N.D. II. 1988) (holding harassment of male employee
by male co-workers did not present actionable sexual harassment claim Title VII) and Garcia v.
Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Harassment by male supervisor
against male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though the harassment has
sexual overtones." (quoting Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993))).
14. See Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. at 833 ("Garcia is the only reported appellate opinion to
directly address this issue."). See also Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 286 (D.
D.C. 1995); McKoy v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D. Ga.
1995).
15. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
16. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52. See also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, No.
Civ.A.94-1483, 1995 WL 133349, at *1 (E.D. La. March 24, 1995) ("The Fifth Circuit has
clearly articulated its position that same sex harassment does not state a claim under Title VII.").
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supervisor. 7 The Court held that "harassment by a male supervisor against
a male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though the
harassment has sexual overtones."' 8 In reaching its decision, the Fifth
Circuit relied 9 on the reasoning of the District Court in Goluszek v. Smith.2"
In Goluszek, the court held that a claim brought by a male employee alleging
that he was sexually harassed by male co-workers2 ' was not actionable under
Title VII. 22
The essence of the reasoning in Goluszek lies in the court's interpretation
of the underlying concerns of Congress when it enacted Title VII.23 The
court found that Congress was concerned with creating equal employment
opportunities by remedying discrimination against disadvantaged groups
resulting from the abuse of an imbalance of power by dominant groups.2 4
Accordingly, the court found that Congress intended to prohibit conduct that
treats all males (or females) as inferior, thereby creating an anti-male (or
female) environment.2 5 The court concluded that the conduct at issue was
not the kind which created an anti-male environment because the plaintiff was
a male working in a male-dominated environment.26 Thus, the court held
that the harassment was not the type of conduct Congress intended to
prohibit.27
In Garcia, despite the Fifth Circuit's reliance on the reasoning of
Goluszek, the Court did not discuss whether or not the plaintiff worked in an
environment that treated all males as inferior.2 8 Nonetheless, the Court
broadly held that harassment by a male against another male is not actionable
under Title VII. 29 Garcia'sholding indicates that the Court does not find
harassment of a male by another male to be capable of creating an anti-male
atmosphere, regardless of the particular facts presented. Thus, according to
Garcia,same-gender sexual harassment is not actionable under Title VII.3 °

17. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 448. The employee, Freddy Garcia, alleged that his supervisor
grabbed his crotch area from behind and made sexual motions. Id.
18. Id. at 451-52 (quoting Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993)).
19. Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 286 (D.D.C. 1995) ("[The Fifth
Circuit in Garcia, relied heavily on the influential district court opinion in Goluszek v. Smith.").
20. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
21. Id. at 1454.
22. Id. at 1456.
23. Id. See also Smith, supra note 5, at 145.
24. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Garcia v. Elf Atochem, 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
29. Id. at 452.
30. Id. Courts have interpreted Garcia's holding to mean that same-gender sexual
harassment is not actionable under Title VII. See Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546,
1548 (W.D. Tex. 1995) ("The Fifth Circuit has clearly and succinctly stated that Title VII
addresses gender discrimination and does not allow a claim for same-gender discrimination.").
See also Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md. 1994);
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Despite the Fifth Circuit's rejection of same-gender sexual harassment
under Title VII, federal district courts remain split on this issue.3 Several
district courts have followed Garcia,32 while others have flatly rejected the
Fifth Circuit's holding.33 Some courts, while not expressly rejecting
Garcia,
have refused to preclude same-gender sexual harassment under Title
34
VII.
Section I of this Note discusses the Congressional intent underlying Title
VII's ban on sex discrimination; the judicial recognition of sexual harassment
as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII; and the treatment of samegender sexual harassment claims prior to Garcia. Section II discusses the

Garcia decision and the reasoning of Goluszek, which the Fifth Circuit in
Garciarelied upon to reject same-gender sexual harassment as a violation of

Title VII.

Section III critiques the Garcia/Goluszekapproach3 5 to addressing the
actionability of same-gender sexual harassment. This section concludes that
the reasoning relied upon in Garcia is seriously flawed because it is based

Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 494 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
31. See Ashworth, 897 F. Supp. at 492 ("The courts ... are split as to whether or not samesex harassment (male against male) is actionable under Title VII."); Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co.,
No. C-3-94-182, 1995 WL 386793, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 1994) ("There is a split among
courts as to whether male against male hostile environment sexual harassment is actionable under
Title VII.").
32. See, e.g., Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. at 834; Myers, 874 F. Supp. at 1548; Benekritis v.
Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 526 (D.S.C. 1995); Ashworth, 897 F. Supp. at 294.
33. See, e.g., Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550
(M.D. Ala. 1995) (concluding that Garcia is inconsistent with existing anti-discrimination
jurisprudence and recognizing an action under Title VII where a homosexual male supervisor
harasses a male employee but does not similarly harass female employees); Pritchett v. Sizeler
Real Estate Management Co., No. Civ.A.93-2351, 1995 WL 241855, at *2 (E.D. La. April 25,
1995) (refusing to follow Garcia's statement that Title VII does not prohibit same-gender sexual
harassment by holding a female employee's claim of sexual harassment by her female supervisor
to be actionable gender discrimination under Title VII); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887
F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (C.D. Ill. 1995); Raney v. Dist. of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 286-89
(D.D.C. 1995) (refusing to follow the questionable precedent of the Fifth Circuit and other
jurisdictions by holding a male employee's claim of sexual harassment by his male supervisor
to be cognizable where, but for his sex, he would not have faced similar discriminatory
treatment).
34. See, e.g., Roe v. K-Mart Corp., No. Civ.A.2:93-2372-18AJ, 1995 WL 316783, at *1
(D.S.C. March 28, 1995) (holding same-gender sexual harassment to be actionable under Title
VII where a male homosexual employee was allegedly terminated because he refused his male
homosexual supervisor's sexual advances); McKoy v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 878
F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that homosexual harassment can violate Title VII
where the employee would not have been harassed but for his or her sex because the plain
language of the statute does not limit Title VII's restriction against discrimination to heterosexual
harassment); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100,
1103 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (holding that same-gender sexual harassment is actionable under Title
VII because the harassment is based on gender where a homosexual supervisor makes offensive
sexual advances to employees of the same sex but does not make advances to employees of the
opposite sex); Nogueras v. University of Puerto Rico, 890 F. Supp. 60, 63 (D.P.R 1995)
(holding that Title VII's language clearly prohibits same-gender sexual harassment).
35. Since the Fifth Circuit's holding in Garcia relies on the reasoning of Goluszek, I will
refer to the Fifth Circuit's treatment of same-gender sexual harassment under Title VII as the
"GarcialGoluszek approach".
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entirely on one district court's determination that Congress did not intend to
prohibit same-gender sexual harassment. Rather than determining whether or
not same-gender sexual harassment constitutes discrimination based on sex,36
the court in Goluszek simply concludes that since Congress did not intend to
prohibit this type of conduct, it is not based on gender.37 Therefore, the
Garcia/Goluszek approach is incorrect insofar as it merely recognizes an
action under Title VII where the harassment creates an attitude of hostility
towards all members of the victim's gender.
Section IV discusses Garcia'simpact on subsequent decisions addressing
the actionability of same-gender sexual harassment under Title VII and
explores the possibility that Garcia reflects the current trend in this area of
the law. Section V proposes a different approach to determining whether
same-gender sexual harassment is a viable cause of action under Title VII.
This Note concludes that sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII
regardless of whether the harasser and the victim are the same gender. To
determine if same-gender sexual harassment is actionable, courts must look
to whether the harassing conduct was based on the person's gender. Where
the conduct at issue is based on gender, it is the type of conduct Congress
intended to prohibit. It is no answer to say that same-gender sexual
harassment is not based on gender because Congress did not intend to
prohibit such conduct. If the harassing conduct amounts to actionable sexual
harassment in the cross-gender context, the same exact conduct cannot be said
to be outside the purview of Title VII merely because it is directed at a
person of the same gender.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Title VII & Congress'sAmbiguous Intent
According to Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against any person "because ...of sex."38 Although the language of Title
VII clearly prohibits sex discrimination in the workplace, the intended scope
of Title VII is ambiguous.39 There is little legislative history available

36. As it is used in Title VII, courts have interpreted "sex" to mean "gender." See infra
notes 85-87 and accompanying text. Based on judicial interpretations of Title VII's language,
"sex" is referred to in this article as "gender." The use of "gender" to describe "sex" within the
mean!ng of Title VII is not intended to imply that courts have correctly defined "sex" within the
meaning of Title VII, nor that "sex" and "gender" are synonymous. Rather, "gender" is used to
describe "sex" in this article in order to analyze the actionability of same-gender sexual
harassment in light of existing judicial interpretations of sexual harassment under Title VII as
well as to avoid confusion within the article. For an in depth discussion on the meaning of "sex"
and "gender" and the synonymous use of these concepts in the law, see generally, Francisco
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructingthe Conflation of "Sex, " "Gender,"
and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
37. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. II. 1988).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). See supra note I for relevant text.
39. See Raney v. Dist. of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 286-87 (D.D.C. 1995).
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concerning Title VII's ban against sex discrimination" because the word
"sex" was added to the proposed statute at the last minute.4 The lack of

legislative history has left courts with the task of interpreting Title VII with
little guidance as to the type of conduct Congress intended to prohibit.42
Relying on the language of Title VII, courts interpreting Title VII shortly
after its enactment concluded that the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment" was intended "to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate

treatment of men and women in employment." 3

Accordingly, courts

recognized Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination as a guarantee of

equal job opportunities for women and men.44

40. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103
(M.D. Tenn. 1995); Raney, 892 F. Supp. at 287. See also Ellen F. Paul, Sexual Harassment as
Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 346 (1990) (noting
the ban on sex discrimination "received no relevant discussion" due to the last minute addition
of "sex" by Title VII's opponents). For comprehensive coverage of Title VII's legislative
history, see generally Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REv. 431 (1966).
41. Opponents of Title VII added the proscription against sex discrimination when it was
on the floor of the House of Representatives as a last minute attempt to prevent Title VII from
passing. 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964). See Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. at 1103 n.6.
See also Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 816-17 (1991) ("[llts proponents
included a number of Congressmen opposed to the Act, who hoped that the inclusion of 'sex'
would highlight the absurdity of the effort as a whole, and contribute to its defeat."); Kristi J.
Johnson, Comment, Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corporation: What Does it Mean to Be
Harassed "Because of' Your Sex?: Sexual Stereotyping and the "Bisexual Harasser Revisited,
79 IoWA L. REV. 731, 735 (1994) (stating that one day before Title VII passed its opponents
amended the word "sex" hoping to strengthen opposition to Title VII).
42. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986).
The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last
minute on the floor of the House of Representatives. The principal argument in
opposition to the amendment was the "sex discrimination" was sufficiently different
from other types of discrimination that it ought to receive separate legislative
treatment. This argument was defeated, the bill quickly passed as amended, and we
are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition
against discrimination based on "sex."
Id. (citations omitted). See also Peirce, supra note 2, at 1071-72 (stating Title VII's history
provides little guidance as to the intended scope of "sex" discrimination because there was little
debate on the subject).
43. Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)
(quoting Sprogis v. United Air lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
44. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987-88 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Title VII has been invoked to strike down a wide variety of impediments to equal
employment opportunity between the sexes, including insufficiently validated tests,
discriminatory seniority systems, weight-lifting requirements, and height and weight
standards solely for those of one gender.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir.
1978) (concluding that by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex, Congress only intended
to guarantee equal job opportunities for males and females); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971).
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When Title VII was amended by the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972," 5
Congress discussed the intended meaning of Title VII's language.46 It
became evident during these discussions that Congress was concerned about
discrimination based on gender, especially the disparate treatment of women
in the workplace.4" Not only did these legislative discussions validate early
judicial interpretations,4" they also provided courts with at least some
guidance in defining actionable sex discrimination. However, the scope of
Title VII was still relatively undefined.
B. Sexual Harassment Under Title VII
The "sexual harassment" 4' 9 cases brought under Title VII shortly after
its enactment illustrate the ambiguity of the statute's coverage.5 0 Courts
that first addressed the scope of Title VII did not agree as to whether or not
sexual harassment was a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title

45. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e17 (1988)).
46. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 987.
47. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1971), reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2140.
Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class. Their self-fulfillment
and development is frustrated because of their sex. Numerous studies have shown
that women are placed in the less challenging, the less responsible, the less
remunerative positions on the basis of their sex alone. Such blatantly disparate
treatment is particularly objectionable in view of the fact that Title VII has
specifically prohibited sex discrimination since its enactment in 1964.
Id. See also Barnes, 561 F.2d at 987.
48. See Peirce, supra note 2, at 1072-73.
[The] early cases of sex discrimination brought under Title VII do provide some
indication of its coverage. These early cases fall into four major categories. First,
some early cases involved challenges to the outright exclusion of members of one sex
from jobs. Second, several cases involved challenges to restrictions having a
disproportionate effect on women. In the third group of cases, plaintiffs challenged
restrictions placed solely on women. Early courts held that these three types of cases
fell under Title VII's protection. In contrast, early courts held that Title VII did not
apply to the fourth type, those cases involving challenges to an employer's
pregnancy-related policy.
Id. (citations omitted).
49. As it is used here, this term is intended to include the broad spectrum of what one might
describe as sexual misconduct, such as sexual requests, favors, innuendoes, and other conduct of
a sexual nature. Any ambiguity in the meaning of sexual harassment at this point is intended as
an illustration of how courts were left to define the scope of "sex discrimination" as well as the
meaning of "sexual harassment' with very little legislative guidance.
50. See, e.g., Barnes, 561 F.2d at 989. In Barnes, a female employee was terminated
because she refused her male supervisor's sexual advances. Id. at 984-85. According to the
court, the pivotal issue was whether such conduct was based upon the employee's sex. Id. at
989. In other words, the court had to decide if such sexual harassment was within the meaning
of sex discrimination under Title VII.
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VII.5 Some courts held that sexual harassment, such as unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual nature,
constitutes the type of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. 2 Other
courts, however, refused to recognize sexual harassment claims under Title
VII. 3 The inconsistent outcomes of these initial judicial interpretations of
Title VII left unresolved the question of whether sexual harassment
'
constitutes discrimination "because of ...sex."54

In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") 5
issued guidelines which determined that sexual harassment 6 is sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. 7 Relying on the EEOC
guidelines, courts generally agreed that sexual harassment constitutes sex
discrimination under Title VII. 8 Since the issuance of the EEOC guide-

51. Id. at 989. See also Peirce, supra note 2, at 1080-83.
52. See, e.g., Barnes, 561 F.2d at 987 (finding a violation of Title VII where a female
employee was fired because she "repulsed her male superior's sexual advances.").
53. e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (rejecting
a sexual harassment claim under Title VII because the male supervisor merely "satisfied a
personal urge."), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) and Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F.
Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (declining to find employer liability for sexual misconduct
because "it would seem wise for Courts to refrain from delving into these matters"), rev', 600
F.2d 211 (1979). See also Johnson, supra note 41, at 737 (noting that federal courts did not
initially consider sexual harassment as sex discrimination under Title VII); Peirce, supra note 2,
at 1072 ("[E]arly courts did not construe Title VII to include a claim for sexual harassment in
the workplace.").
54. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also Paul, supra note 40,
at 338-40.
55. The EEOC was created by Title VII and is the administrative body responsible for
defining the nature of and enforcing the proscriptions against employment discrimination under
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1988). See also Bradley Golden, Note, Harris v. Forklift: The
Supreme Court Takes One Step Forivard and Two Steps Back on the Issue of Hostile Work
Environment Sexual Harassment, 1994 DET. C.L. REv. 1151, 1160 (1994). Courts owe
considerable deference to the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). Guidelines issued by the EEOC are "not controlling on the courts
[but] by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). See
also Barnes, 561 F.2d at 989; Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
56. The EEOC defines sexual harassment as follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995).
57. Id. The guidelines state that "[h]arassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703
of Title VII."
58. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63; Barnes, 561 F.2d at 989; Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d
934, 945 (D.D.C. 1981).
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lines, courts have
consistently recognized two types of sexual harassment:
"quid pro quo"' 9 and "hostile work environment.560
1. Quid Pro Quo Harassment
Quid pro quo harassment was the first type of sexual harassment to be
recognized under Title VII.61 Quid pro quo harassment occurs when
tangible job benefits are explicitly or implicitly conditioned upon submission
to conduct of a sexual nature and 62adverse job consequences result from the
refusal to submit to such conduct.
To establish an action for quid pro quo harassment the employee must
show that: (1) she or he is a member of a protected class;63 (2) she or he
was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, such as sexual advances or
requests for sexual favors; (3) the harassment was based on sex; and (4) the
harassment altered the terms and conditions of employment.' The employee does not
have to prove that the employer had knowledge of the harassing
65

conduct.

59. The term, quid pro quo, literally means "something for something." BLACKS LAW
DIcTioNARY 1248 (6th ed. 1990).
60. Golden, supra note 55, at 1355. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir.
1991); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65; Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1lth Cir. 1982);
Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 290-91 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d
611, 618-19 (6th Cir. 1986). See also Smith, supra note 5, at 138.
61. Debra L. Raskin, Sexual Harassment in Employment, 902 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 589, 591
(1994). See, e.g., Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976) (recognizing a claim of
sexual harassment as sex discrimination where female employee was fired after refusing
supervisor's sexual advances); Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990.
62. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987). See also Golden,
supra note 55, at 1356 ("Quid pro quo harassment occurs when an employer promises favorable
treatment in exchange for sex from an employee, or where such favorable treatment is withheld
if requests for sex are denied."); Marren Roy, Comment, Employer Liabilityfor Sexual Harassment: A Search for Standards in the Wake of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 48 SMU L.
REv. 263, 265 (1994) ([Q]uid pro quo [harassment] . . . involves the offer of tangible
employment benefits by a supervisor or employer in exchange for sexual favors from the subordinate employee.").
63. In order to be in a protected class, the plaintiff must either be a man or a woman
because Title VII prohibits sex discrimination against both men and women. Prescott v.
Independent Life & Accident Ins., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1549 (1995). The employee simply has
to state that he or she is a man or a woman in order to satisfy this element. HENRY H. PERIrIr,
JR., EMPLOYEE DISMIssAL LAW AND PRACTIcE § 2.5 (3rd ed. 1992); See also Henson, 682 F.2d
at 903 (stating that satisfaction of this element "requires a simple stipulation that the employee
is a man or a woman.").
64. Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1549; Ryczek v. Guest Services Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754, 760
(1995).
65. Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1549. As discussed below, under the hostile work environment
theory, the plaintiff must show knowledge on the part of the employer. Id.
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2. Hostile Work Environment
The EEOC guidelines define hostile work environment as "conduct
[which] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an

individual's work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive work environment."66 In accordance with the EEOC guidelines,
courts began recognizing hostile work environment actions under Title VI. 67
In 1986, the Supreme Court addressed the viability of hostile work

environment harassment under Title VII in its landmark decision, Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson."

The Court in Meritor relied on the EEOC's

definition of sexual harassment69 and held that "a plaintiff may establish a
violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created

a hostile or abusive working environment."7 The Court limited its holding,
however, by stating that not all instances of harassment in the workplace fall
within the meaning of Title VI 7' The Court concluded that in order to be
actionable, the sexual harassment must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive

working environment.'

2

When determining if the conduct complained of is sufficiently severe and
pervasive to constitute hostile work environment harassment, courts must
consider the totality of the circumstances.73 The factors courts will look to

in considering the totality of the circumstances include "the frequency of the

66. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995).
67. Smith, supra note 5, at 138. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Henson, 682 F.2d at 902-05. See also Roy, supra note 62, at 265; Golden, supra note
55, at 1360.
68. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
69. Id. at 66. See also Debra L. Raskin, Sex in the Workplace: Stereotypingand Harassing,
C463 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 259, 269 (1989).
70. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. In reaching its decision, The Court also relied on its finding
that the "language of Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination." Id.
at 64. By refusing to confine Title VII's language to economic injury, the court recognized that
Title VII protects employees from psychological and emotional harm as well. Id. at 65-66. See
also Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)
("[E]mployee's psychological as well as economic fringes are statutorily entitled to protection
from employer abuse."). It has been noted that recognition of hostile work environment
harassment claims is based on the theory that an employee's work atmosphere constitutes a
"condition" or "term" of employment protected under Title VII. Joshua F. Thorpe, GenderBased Harassment and the Hostile Work Environment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1368. See also
Johnson, supra note 41, at 737 ("The underlying premise of the hostile work environment is that
an employee's work atmosphere constitutes a protected 'term, condition, or privilege' of
employment under Title VII.").
71. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. See also Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
72. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. To state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment
under Title VII, it is not necessary to prove the harassing conduct seriously affected the
complaining employee's psychological well-being or lead to injury. Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993). According to Harris,a plaintiff could recover based on hostile work
environment harassment "[s]o long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is
perceived, as hostile or abusive." Id. at 370-71.
73. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69. See also Smith, supra note 5, at 140.
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discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance."'74
Some courts have narrowly applied the hostile work environment
standards set forth in Meritor by refusing to recognize certain types or
infrequent instances of harassment as sufficiently severe and pervasive to
constitute hostile environment sexual harassment.'
Other courts, on the
other hand, have permitted broad application of those standards by finding
various types and less frequent amounts of harassing behavior sufficiently
severe and pervasive to be actionable hostile environment sexual harassment
under Title VII.76 While courts may vary in the expansiveness of the
definition of hostile work environment harassment, the following elements are
generally required to establish such a claim:
(1) the employee is a member of a protected class; (2) the employee was
subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature; (3) the harassment complained of was based upon sex; and (4) the
charged sexual harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with
the plaintiffs work performance and creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive work environment; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior
liability.7
Hostile environment harassment is not as obvious as quid pro quo
harassment because it typically involves a wide range of harassing conduct
that amounts to actionable sexual harassment only if it is considered by the
court to be offensive or hostile. Quid pro quo harassment, on the other hand,
is more obvious because it involves specific instances of conduct that are
easily identified as sexual harassment, such as where a supervisor requests
sexual favors from a subordinate employee in exchange for tangible job
benefits.7 In addition, district courts have consistently based their interpretations of quid pro quo sexual harassment on those articulated in the EEOC

74. Harris, 114 S.Ct. at 371. See also Price v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, 850 F. Supp.
934 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding that the court must look to the totality of the circumstances,
including the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct, the extent to which it is
physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it interferes with the employee's work

performance, to determine if the conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile
environment).
75. See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing

a judgment for the plaintiff where a male supervisor made several offensive and distasteful
comments and made a reference to masturbation because the supervisor never touched her, he
did not invite her to have sex with him, and the incidents were too infrequent).
76. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that
aggressive acts may constitute a hostile work environment even if they are not sexual in nature).
77. Smith, supranote 5, at 141-42. See also HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL
LAWv AND PRAcTIcE § 2.5 (3rd ed. 1992). See, e.g. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05; Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Walden Books Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100 n.I (M.D. Tenn.
1995).
78. Roy, supra note 62, at 265.
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guidelines, whereas judicial interpretations have varied as to the amount and
severity of conduct required to state a claim for hostile environment
harassment under the "sufficiently severe and pervasive" standard created by

Meritor.79 Thus, quid pro quo harassment is not the topic of as much debate

as hostile environment sexual harassment.80
Although the recognition of sexual harassment as sex discrimination has
received criticism,"' it is beyond serious dispute that sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII
However, the actionability of same-gender
sexual harassment is hotly disputed. Early treatment of cases involving
sexual harassment in which the harasser and the victim are the same gender
illustrates the significance of judicial interpretations of the phrase "because
of... sex." 3
C. Same-Gender Sexual HarassmentClaims PriorTo Garcia
1. "Unwelcome Homosexual Harassment" and "The Bisexual Harasser"

The first cases involving same-gender sexual harassment 4 focused on
the meaning of the term "sex" ' under Title VII. Using its plain meaning,8 6 courts have construed the word "sex" to mean "gender."87 Consis-

79. Golden, supra note 55, at 1158. Courts have closely patterned their definitions of quid
pro quo harassment after the language in the guidelines issued by the EEOC. Compare 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a)(1) (1995) ("Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission
to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment . . .") and Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1408 ("Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when
submission to sexual conduct is made a condition of concrete employment benefits.").
80. Golden, supranote 55, at 1158; Raskin, supra note 69, at 268.
81. See, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that Congress was not envisioning this type of individual harassment).
See also Paul, supra note 40, at 352 (using the case of the bisexual harasser to illustrate the
doctrinal anomalies of sexual harassment under Title VII); Peirce, supra note 2, at 1094.
82. L. Camille Hdbert, Sexual Harassmentis Gender Harassment,43 U. KAN. L. REv. 565,
573 (1995). See also Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the
Literature, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 57 (1993).
83. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Not All Speech is Equal: Some Thoughts on Lesbians, Free
Speech and Harassment,3 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 59, 66 n.15 (1994).
84. Although these cases were decided before the Supreme Court recognized the existence
of hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII, federal courts had already adopted the
EEOC Guidelines and held claims based on a hostile working environment to be actionable under
Title VII.
85. "Unfortunately, the term 'sex' possesses two different connotations; it can relate to the
'traditional' notion of sex as a gender-based classification or it can relate to erotic desires."
Johnson, supra note 41, at 737-38. See also Thorpe, supra note 70, at 1378 n.80 (noting that the
linguistic ambiguity in the term "sex" does not exist in the context of race, national origin, or
religion).
86. According to rules of statutory interpretation, absent any evidence of legislative intent,
words are to be given their common and ordinary meaning. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742
F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). Accord Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
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tent with this "traditional" interpretation of "sex,"" courts focused on
whether members of one sex were being treated differently than members of
the other sex.8 9 Courts applied a "but for" test in order to determine if the
victim of the alleged sexual harassment was treated differently than members
of the opposite sex.9" The "but-for" test requires the plaintiff to show that
he or she would not have been harassed but for his or her gender.91
These initial same-gender sexual harassment cases illustrate the
assumption made by courts that if a person sexually harasses members of the
opposite sex, he or she must be heterosexual and if an employee sexually
harasses members of the same sex, he or she must be homosexual.92 As a
result of this assumption, when courts applied the "but-for" test in the context
of same-gender sexual harassment, the actual or perceived sexual orientation
of the harasser (or the victim) dictated the result.93 For example, early
courts agreed that a claim was authorized under Title VII where the

87. See, e.g., Hopkins v Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 833 n.17 (stating
that courts have recognized "sex" under Title VII to mean "gender"); Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085
("The phrase in Title VII prohibiting discrimination based on sex, in its plain meaning, implies
that it is unlawful to discriminate against women because they are women and against men
because they are men."); Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89.C.4515, 1990 WL
165611, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1990) (concluding that Title VII is limited to the prohibition
of discrimination based on gender). See also Johnson, supra note 41, at 737-38.
88. Several courts have noted that "gender" is the traditional meaning of the word "sex" and
since it is used in the same context as race, color and national origin, which are traditionally
understood to describe immutable characteristics, Congress merely intended "sex" to be given its
traditional interpretation. Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *4, (6th Cir. Jan. 15,
1992). See also DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979)
(arguing that "sex" only means "gender" because "Congress had only the traditional notions of
'sex in mind," (quoting Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir.
1977)); Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (stating the lack of legislative history and the circumstances
involving Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination indicates that Congress intended
nothing more than the traditional concept of sex).
89. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-04 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that
sexual harassment is based upon sex if it inflicts disparate treatment upon a member of one sex
with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
114 S.Ct. 367, 372 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("The critical issue, Title VII's text
indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."). See also Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Manual (BNA) §§ 615, 615.2 (b)(3) ("[Tihe crucial inquiry is whether
the harasser treats a member or members of one sex differently from members of the other
sex.").
90. Johnson, supra note 41, at 738. See also Peirce, supra note 2, at 1087; Megan P. Norris
& Mark A Randon, Sexual Orientation and the Workplace: Recent Developments in Discrimination and Harassment Law, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 233, 236 (1993); Samuel A. Marcosson,
Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation:A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII,
81 GEO. L.J. 1, 9 (1992).
91. Peirce, supra note 2, at 1087. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n,55 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. Ill 1981). See also
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986); Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-04.
92. See, e.g., Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89.C.4515, 1990 WL 165611, at
*7 (ND. Ill. Oct. 16, 1990) (relying on cases dealing with unwelcome homosexual advances
where the record contained no evidence that the harasser was a homosexual).
93. See Peirce, supra note 2, at 1094-95. See also Norris & Randon, supra note 90, at 236-
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harassment is between a harasser and victim of opposite sex, 94 or where the
harasser is homosexual." However, a claim under Title VII would not be
actionable where the harasser is bisexual because it could not be said that the
harassment would not have occurred but for the victim's gender since a
bisexual would presumably harass both women and men.96
The issue of harassment by a bisexual supervisor was first discussed in
the dicta of a cross-gender sexual harassment decision, Barnes v. Costle.97
In Barnes, the court found that the discharge of a female employee for
rejecting her male supervisor's sexual advances was a violation of Title
VII. 98 However, the court noted in dicta that where the harasser is bisexual,
the harasser's sexual advances do not constitute discrimination under Title
VII. 99 The court reasoned that the "but-for" test could not be satisfied
where the harasser is bisexual because the harassment would have occurred
regardless of the victim's gender.' 0 According to this reasoning, sexual

94. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59 (1986) (finding a Title VII
violation where a female employee was sexually harassed by her male supervisor).
95. See, eg., Wright, 511 F. Supp. at 309.
96. See, e.g., Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (noting discrimination cannot be based on sex in the
case of a bisexual supervisor); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting it
is not sex discrimination where a bisexual supervisor harasses both men and women equally);
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting it is not gender discrimination if
a bisexual insists on sexual favors because both males and females are treated alike). See also
Peirce, supra note 2, at 1088-89; Paul, supra note 40, at 351 (noting "if a bisexual of either sex
preys equally upon men and women, he (or she) is beyond the reach of Title VII.").
97. 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
98. Id. at 989-90.
99. Id. at 990 n.55. This position was reiterated by the same court four years later. Bundy,
641 F.2d at 942 n.7). Bundy was among the first cases to recognize an action based on a
discriminatory work environment, which is similar to what is now known as "hostile or abusive
work environment" harassment, even though the employee had not lost any tangible job benefits.
Id. After finding the conduct at issue to be a violation of Title VII, the court noted:
We noted that in each instance the question is one of but-for causation: would the
complaining employee have suffered the harassment had he or she been of a different
gender? Only by a reductio ad absurdum could we imagine a case of harassmentthat
is not sex discrimination where a bisexual supervisorharasses men and women alike.
Id. at 942 n.7. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, the only situation that could not be
sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII is where a bisexual supervisor harasses both
men and women. Id.
100. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55. The court stated:
These situations, like that at bar, are to be distinguished from a bisexual
superior who conditions the employment opportunities of a subordinate of either gender upon participation in a sexual affair. In the case of the bisexual superior, the
insistence upon sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimination because it
would apply to male and female employees alike.
Id. Accord Henson, 682 F.2d 897. Although Henson involved cross-gender sexual harassment,
the court noted that "[e]xcept in the exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervisor, it should
be clear that sexual harassment is discrimination based upon sex." Id. at 905. The court
reasoned:
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advances made by a homosexual supervisor towards an employee of the same
gender constitute a violation of Title VII because the harassment is based on
the victim's gender since a homosexual presumably would target only
members of his or her own gender.'0 '
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit followed the Barnes dicta in
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Company."2 Although Rabidue involved
cross-gender sexual harassment, 3 the Court elaborated on Title VII's
scope by applying the reasoning articulated in Barnes to other situations. The
court stated that sexual conduct would not be actionable if it were equally
offensive to both men and women." 4 The court's classification of nonactionable claims includes any situation involving conduct that is equally
offensive to both men and women, whether or not the harasser is bisexual.105
Since the sexual orientation of the harasser was not a factor in the
Rabidue court's "but-for" analysis, Rabidue characterizes non-actionable
claims more broadly than Barnes. In other words, Rabidue allows more
opportunity for harassment to fall outside the scope of Title VII because
harassment perpetrated by any person against both men and women is beyond
Title VII's coverage. In Barnes, on the other hand, only harassment
perpetrated by bisexuals is exempt from Title VII's coverage.
Also consistent with the Barnes "but-for" analysis' 6 is Wright v. Youth
Methodist Services.'07 The court in Wright was the first to recognize
"homosexual advances" as actionable sexual harassment under Title VII.' °s
In Wright, a male employee alleged that his male supervisor "made overt

There may be cases in which a supervisor makes sexual overtures to workers of both
sexes or where the conduct complained of is equally offensive to male and female
workers. In such cases, the sexual harassment would not be based upon sex because
men and women are accorded like treatment.
Id. at 904. See also Johnson, supra note 41, at 738 ("[When the supervisor equally harasses
male and female employees, the situation does not support a Title VII sexual harassment charge
because the employee's gender is not a but-for cause of the conduct.").
101. Id.
102. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
103. Id. at 614-16.
104. Id. at 620. ("It is of significance to note that instances of complained of sexual conduct
that prove equally offensive to male and female workers would not support a Title VII sexual
harassment charge because both men and women were accorded like treatment."). But see
Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (D. Wyo. 1993) (holding that
harassment directed at both genders does not preclude an employee's Title VII claim for sexual
harassment).
105. Rabidue, 85 F.2d at 620.
106. Norris & Randon, supra note 90, at 236 ("Following Barnes, other courts began to
recognize a cause of action for homosexual advances. However, these courts followed the
Barnes dicta and conditioned their recognition of a cause of action upon the fact that an
individual was treated differently than members of the opposite sex.").
107. 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
108. Id. at 310.
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homosexual advances" towards him.'0 9 The employee claimed that he lost
his job because he rejected his supervisor's advances."'

The court held

that terminating an employee for refusing homosexual advances is a violation
V"
of Title VII.

The court applied the "but-for" test"' and concluded that

the conduct was based on the employee's gender because it involved "an
alleged demand of a male employee that would not be directed to a
female."" 3
Interestingly, the alleged sexual advances in Wright were referred to as
"homosexual advances."" 4 If this case involved cross-gender sexual
advances the harassment would have been referred to as "sexual advances,"
not "heterosexual advances." Though the difference may be subtle, by
replacing "sexual" with "homosexual" the court makes two assumptions: (1)
that the term "sexual advances" only includes heterosexual sexual conduct;
and (2) that the only conduct in which homosexuals engage is sexual. Since
both cross-gender and same-gender sexual harassment involve conduct that
is sexual in nature, the sexual orientation of the harasser should not alter the
way in which courts describe or view the conduct at issue. It is only the

109. Id. at 308.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 310. The court stated:
It is no answer to say that a similar condition could be imposed on a male
subordinate by a heterosexual female superior, or upon a subordinate of either gender
by a homosexual superior of the same gender. In each instance, the legal problem
would be identical to that confronting us now the exaction of a condition which, but
for his or her sex, the employee would not have faced.
Id. Accord Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (holding
that "unwelcomed homosexual harassment . . . states a violation of Title VII"); Parrish v.
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89.C.4515, 1990 WL 165611, *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1990)
(stating that unwelcome homosexual advances are actionable under Title VII because the
advances are based on the victim's gender since the harasser would not similarly treat an
employee of the nonpreferred gender).
112. Commentators have described the application of the "but-for" test in Wright as follows:
[I]n Wright . . . the court adopted a "but for" test, holding that a cause of action
arises where the individual would not have been harassed but for his or her sex...
However, in these early cases the courts did not seem to recognize a cause of action
for sexual harassment in and of itself. The prohibited activity was still gender
discrimination, which would include harassment on the basis of gender, as opposed
to all harassment that was sexual in nature.
Norris & Randon, supra note 90, at 236 (citations omitted).
113. Id. Accord Joyner, 597 F. Supp. at 542 (finding sexual advances directed at a male
employee to be based upon sex because "the evidence established the ... [male supervisor's]
homosexual proclivities"); Parrish,No. 89.C.4515, 1990 WL 165611, at *7 ('[U]nwelcome
homosexual advances . . . [are] based on the employer's sexual preference and necessarily

involve- the plaintiff's gender, for an employee of the non-preferred gender would not inspire
the same treatment. Thus, unwelcome homosexual advances, like unwelcome heterosexual
advances, are actionable under Title VII.").
114. Wright, 511 F. Supp. at 308.
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gender of the harasser and the victim that marks the difference between the
two situations, thus the conduct should be referred to in the same manner.
The Wright court's use of different language to describe the same type
of harassment simply because the harasser is homosexual indicates the
court's differential treatment of cases involving homosexuals and those
involving heterosexuals. The differential treatment lies in the court's
unnecessary focus on the harasser's sexual orientation. Although the result
in Wright is proper, the court's emphasis on the harasser's sexual orientation
creates evidentiary questions that are not even considered in cross-gender
sexual harassment cases. For example, in Wright, the victim complained that
his supervisor made sexual advances towards him and that he lost his job as
a result of his refusal to submit to those advances. In applying the "but-for"
test, the court was satisfied that the harassment was based on gender only
because the harasser was homosexual and thus would not subject women to
the same harassment. In the cross-gender context, on the other hand, the
sexual orientation of the harasser has never been raised as an issue in
determining whether the harassment is based on gender.
The type of conduct at issue in Wright is based on the victim's gender
because conduct that is sexual in nature exploits the victim's gender. Sexual
advances may and often are motivated by factors other than sexual attraction." 5 The court completely ignored the possibility that sexual harassment
may be motivated by something other than sexual attraction, such as the desire to assert power and dominance over subordinate employees. Sexual
behavior exploits the victim's gender even if the harasser is not in actuality
sexually attracted to the victim. The question of whether the harassment was
based on gender should not turn on the sexual orientation of the harasser
since the conduct exploits the victim's gender no matter what the harasser's
motivation.
In sum, the first courts to address the viability of sexual harassment
claims involving a harasser and victim of the same gender focused their
analysis on the harasser. These cases illustrate that the sexual orientation of
the harasser was the dispositive factor in determining whether the harassment
was based on gender." 6 Courts essentially treated same-gender sexual

115. Judith I. Avner, Sexual Harassment: Building a Consensusfor Change, 3 SPG KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 58 (1994) ("Sexual harassment is about the abuse of power. It is not
about sex. It is not about romance. Sexual harassment raises difficult and frightening issues
about sexuality, power, personal relationships, and the ways in which we value or devalue
individuals.").
116. It is interesting to note that evidence of a harasser's heterosexuality is not required
in cross-gender cases to conclude that harassment was based upon sex. If a male supervisor
directs sexual advances towards a female employee, the sexual orientation of the man is not even
considered. It is assumed, based on nothing more than the fact that the advances were directed
at the opposite sex, that he is heterosexual, and thus the harassment must have been based on
gender.
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harassment as a homosexuality issue." 7 Thus, it is established by these
cases that Title VII protects all employees from unwelcome sexual advances
made by a homosexual harasser." 8 However, these cases do not answer the
broader question of whether Title VII protects all employees from sexual
harassment where the harasser (homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual) and

the victim are the same gender.
2. Sexual Harassment Directed At Homosexuals
Judicial treatment of same-gender sexual harassment under Title VII has
varied depending on whether courts focused on the harasser or the victim.
In the cases discussed in the previous section, courts determined whether the
harassment was based on the victim's gender by focusing on the harasser.

Other courts, on the other hand, have made this determination by focusing on
the victim of the harassment. This difference in focus has had an anomalous
impact on the actionability of sexual harassment claims involving a harasser
and victim of the same gender. For instance, Title VII proscribes harassment
carried out by a person who is, or is believed to be, a homosexual," 9 but

it does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. 2 ' There-

117. See Vandeventer v Wabash Nat. Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D. Ind. 1995). The
court in Vandeventer stated:
When a man touches a woman in a sexual manner, or asks her to have sexual
relations with him, it can be presumed that he is doing so because she is a woman.
Her gender is probably not incidental. It is only with same-sex harassment that the
distinction becomes very important. Some courts try to address the distinction by
framing it'as a homosexuality issue; this court does not believe that to be the proper
course.

Id.
118. SOLOTOFF & HENRY S. KRAMER, SEXUAL DIscRIMINATIoN AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN THE WORKPLACE § 3.04[3][b] (1994).

119. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
120. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979). See also
Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135 (S. D. Tex. 1993) (holding Title VII
does not protect homosexuals from harassment or discrimination in the workplace since such
treatment arises from affectional preference rather than the person's gender); Dillon v. Frank,
No. 92-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) (noting courts have unanimously held that
Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation); Ruth v. Children's Med.
Ctr., No. 90-4069, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19062, at *15 (6th Cir. Aug. 8, 1991) ("Title VII does
not prohibit discrimination based upon affectional or sexual orientation, as the statutory provision
proscribing sex discrimination uses the term 'sex to refer only to membership in a class
delineated by gender."); Kelley v. Vaughn, 760 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1991) ("sex" within the
meaning of Title VII's prohibition against employment discrimination refers to gender, not
sexual orientation); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert.denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990) (holding Title VII not to prohibit discrimination against
(rejecting
Title Carreno
VII claim
for harassment
theOp.
(D. because
Kan. Sept.
27, 1990)
harassment
No. 89-4083-S
Union No.because
226, slip
occurred
v. Local
plaintiff
was
homosexuals);
a662-63
homosexual,
not
because
he
was
male);
Holloway
v.
Arthur
Andersen
&
Co.,
566
F.2d
659,
(9th Cir. 1977) (reasing to interpret the term "sex" beyond its "traditional meaning"
because Title VII did not intend to protect against sexual orientation discrimination); Parrish v.
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fore, Title VII prohibits homosexual sexual harassment, but it does not
prohibit harassment against homosexuals.'
This bizarre result is a product of narrow-minded and rigid statutory
interpretation of the word "sex.' ' 22 Despite the lack of legislative intent
surrounding Title VII's proscription against sex discrimination, courts have
insisted that Congress intended "sex" to mean gender, and nothing else.'
Since sexual orientation does not fall within the meaning of "sex," Title VII
does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. Instead of
recognizing that sexual harassment in the form of attacks against the victim's
actual or perceived sexual orientation is discrimination based on gender,
courts have characterized such conduct as non-actionable sexual orientation
discrimination.124
2 5 The alThis judicial reaction is best illustrated by Dillon v. Frank.'
leged conduct in Dillon involved sexual epithets directed at the plaintiff's
perceived homosexuality.' 26 The plaintiff brought a Title VII action based

Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89.C.4515, 1990 WL 165611, *7 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (noting that
Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals, but that it does prohibit
unwelcome homosexual advances). See also Marcosson, supra note 90, at 10; David A. Landau,
Employment DiscriminationAgainst Lesbians and Gays: The Incomplete Legal Responses of the
United States and The European Union, 4 DuKE COMP. & INT'L. 335, 355 (1994); David E.
Morrison, You've Built the Bridge, Why Don't You Cross It? A Call for State Labor Lavs
ProhibitingPrivate Employment Discriminationon the Basis of Sexual Orientation,26 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 245, 252-56 (1992); Kenneth S. McLaughlin, Jr., Challenging the Constitutionalityof
President Clinton's Compromise: A PracticalAlternative to the Military's "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" Policy, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 179, 205-06 (1994); Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered
Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 103, 118-20
(1994).
121. See Norris & Randon, supra note 90, at 246.
Existing case law suggests that . .. under Title VII, an employer is not
required to provide a homosexual with a working environment free of harassment
resulting solely because the employee is a homosexual. However, in all jurisdictions,
employers must guard against direct homosexual advances, as such advances may give
rise to actionable quid pro quo or hostile environment sexual harassment.
Id.
122. Ettelbrick, supra note 83, at 64.
[Miost federal courts ... have refused to interpret Title VII sex discrimination law
to prohibit sexually harassing speech directed at lesbians and gay men in the
workplace. The effect of strict, narrow constructions of sexual harassment caselaw
and sex discrimination statutes has led to the untempered allowance of hostile,
sometimes assaultive, work environments for lesbians and gay men.
Id.
123. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
124. Ettelbrick, supra note 83, at 65 ("When a gay employee is involved, regardless of the
form or type of harassment, the court usually concludes that the case is a gay case, not a sexual
harassment case, and rejects the claim.").
125. No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
126. Id. at *1.
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on hostile work environment sexual harassment. 2 ' The issue before the
court was whether the harassing conduct 2 ' was directed at the plaintiff
because he is male. The plaintiff was not asking the court to recognize
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as a violation of Title VII.
Rather, the plaintiff was asking the court to recognize that such conduct was
based on his gender, thus constituting sexual harassment under Title VII.
However, instead of focusing on whether these comments were made because
of the plaintiff's gender, the court focused on the fact that the comments
were motivated by his perceived homosexuality. 29 After stating that the
comments were motivated by hatred towards the plaintiff's perceived sexual
orientation, the court refused to recognize such conduct as sex discrimination
under Title VII. 3 ° The court reached this conclusion by characterizing the
conduct
as sexual orientation discrimination, which is not a violation of Title
3
vII.' 1
Even though the harassment in Dillon may have been motivated by the
plaintiff's sexual orientation, it was also based on his gender insofar as it
was motivated by gender stereotypes.'
According to gender stereotypes,

127. Id. at *3.
128. The conduct in Dillon involved comments such as "Dillon sucks dicks" and "Dillon
gives head." Id. at * 1.
129. The court framed the issue as "whether such a hostile working environment involving
sexual epithets and directed at a person because of perceived sexual behavior (homosexuality)
is also proscribed by Title VII." Id. at *4.
130. Id. at *7.
131. Id. See also Marcosson, supra note 90, at 31-32 (citations omitted). Marcosson states:
The only possible way to reconcile [Dillon] . . . the rest of the EEOC's
regulations and policy guidance on sexual harassment, is to conclude that homophobic
sexual harassment is entitled to a specific exemption from the law forbidding
offensive hostile work environments ... [because] this seems to me the only way to
limit the principles underlying the sexual harassment case law to avoid the conclusion
that antigay harassment is included among the hostile work environments barred by

Title VII.
Id.

132. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, on remand, 737 F. Supp. 1202 (Dist.
Col. 1989) (Justice Brennan, concurring) (concluding that acting according to sex stereotypes
constitutes action on the basis of gender under Title VII). One commentator describes how
gender stereotyping constitutes sex discrimination as follows:
[Tihe harassment in ... Dillon was gender-based in the broader sense. Because it
was sexual in nature, the harassment reinforced male-created and male-dominated

norms regarding the appropriateness of sexual conversation and conduct in the
workplace. In this sense, it was directed at women, even if the immediate target was
a man.
More fundamentally, antigay harassment ... is "targeted" at women because
it reinforces stereotypes about appropriate gender roles. The reinforcement of
stereotypes is antithetical to the purposes of Title VII. The Supreme Court has held
that employment decisions based upon stereotyped gender classifications are unlawful
under Title VII. Thus, even more than most sexual harassment that which is directed
at gay men and lesbians in the workplace fits the paradigm of sex discrimination, for
it is based upon the ultimate stereotype of proper sexual roles.
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it is acceptable for women to engage in the same sexual activities for which
the plaintiff in Dillon was harassed for allegedly having engaged. In Dillon,
the plaintiff was harassed because he was a male who allegedly engaged in
sexual acts that, according to gender stereotypes of proper sexual roles, only
women should do. Notwithstanding the finding in Dillon that the harassing
conduct was "clearly sexual in nature,"'3 3 the court held that it did not
constitute hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII. 34
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins 35 presented an obstacle to the Dillon court's narrow-minded
conclusion. In Price Waterhouse,the Court held that the treatment of female
employees according to the notion that women cannot, or must not, be aggressive, constitutes harassment based on gender. 36 Amazingly, to distinguish Price Waterhouse, the Dillon court claimed that the comments directed
at the plaintiff in Dillon were not "sex stereotyped remarks.' 3 7 In Dillon,
the plaintiffs co-workers harassed him because they believed he was a
homosexual. This belief, unless the plaintiff's co-workers had actual
knowledge that he was in fact a homosexual, was based on the "ultimate
gender stereotype."' 38 To the extent that the plaintiff in Dillon was the target of harassment because he did not conform to the stereotypical conception
of a heterosexual male,13 1 the harassment was based on his gender.
As Dillon illustrates, courts assume that because sexual orientation
discrimination and sexual harassment of a homosexual are often manifested
in the same ways, 4 ' the harassment is purely based on sexual orientation,
and not on gender. The core of this assumption is that gender is not relevant

Marcosson, supra note 90, at 24 (1992) (citations omitted).
133. Dillon, No. 92-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *6.
134. Id. at *7.
135. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), on remand, 737 F. Supp. 1202 (Dist. Col. 1989). In Price
Waterhouse, a female employee was subjected to verbal abuse because she did not look or act
according to stereotypical gender roles. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-52. The Court found
the harassment to be a violation of Title VII because the harassment was based on sexual
stereotypes. Id.
136. Id. at 250 (Brennan, J., concurring).
137. Dillon, No. 92-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *9.
138. Marcosson, supra note 90, at 1 ("[S]exual orientation harassment is indistinguishable
from gender-based sexual harassment . . . [because] it is based on the ultimate gender
stereotype.").
139. Ettelbrick, supra note 83, at 65-66.
Wouldn't it be reasonable to conclude that Dillon's co-workers taunted and harassed
him because they stereotypically viewed him to be less than a man? Doesn't the
employer's admonition "to fight back when taunted" reinforce the view of how a
"real" man should respond? Couldn't this be logically viewed as harassment
"because of sex" in the way that evidence of sex stereotyping may indicate
discriminatory animus?
Id.(footnotes omitted).
140. Avner, supra note 115, at 60.
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to discrimination against gays and lesbians. 4 ' By making this assumption,
courts have separated gender from sexual orientation.' 42 However, the
experiences of lesbian and gay employees indicate that gender does play a
role in sexual orientation discrimination. For example, representatives of gay
and lesbian organizations have reported that "any employee who exhibits
what is perceived as gender non-conformity, whether it is a 'too masculine'
female or a 'too feminine' male, is likely to suffer from a range of
discriminatory acts, including sexual harassment, name calling, physical
violence, and job loss."' 43 Thus, by failing to see the relevance of gender
in situations involving harassment against homosexuals, courts have created
an artificial distinction between gender and homosexuality. 44
The Dillon court essentially dismissed the plaintiff's claim because he
was believed to be homosexual and the alleged conduct involved the subject
of homosexuality. The court did not even consider whether the conduct was
based on the plaintiff's gender. Nor does the court explain why harassment
"because of perceived sexual behavior" is not harassment based on gender.
Where sexual harassment is directed at a homosexual, courts should not deny
that the harassment is based on her or his gender merely because the
harassment manifests itself as an attack against the victim's sexual orientation. Just as "[w]omen are not the only persons who are entitled to a
working environment that is not sexually hostile and degrading," '45 heterosexuals are not the only persons entitled to a work environment free of
sexually hostile and degrading harassment.
In sum, courts have applied the "but-for" test in same-gender sexual
harassment cases to determine whether the individual was harassed because
of her or his gender. 46 In early cases involving a harasser and a victim of
the same gender, the outcome of the "but-for" test often depended on the
sexual orientation of either the harasser or the victim. For instance, some
courts recognized same-gender sexual harassment 47 on the theory that, but
for the victim's gender, he or she would not have been subjected to the
"unwelcome homosexual advances.'1 4 However, these courts also concluded that "but-for" causation could not be established in cases involving
either a bisexual harasser 149 or a harasser who was equally offensive to both
men and women.'s In cases involving same-gender sexual harassment

141. Arriola, supra note 120, at 119.
142. Id. at 118.
143. Avner, supra note 115, at 60.
144. Arriola, supra note 120, at 121.
145. H6bert, supra note 82, at 576.
146. Johnson, supra note 41, at 738. See also Peirce, supra note 2, at 1089, 1094.
147. This has been the result for same-gender sexual harassment claims in which the
harasser is homosexual. See supra text accompanying note 116-18.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 108-13.
149. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
150. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986).
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against homosexuals, courts did not reach the question of whether the sexual
harassment was based on gender. Rather, courts concluded that "sex" does

not include sexual orientation'

and dismissed cases involving sexual

harassment directed at homosexuals because Title VII does not prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination.'5 2 Thus, Title VII does not prohibit sexual
harassment that is directed at gays and lesbians because they are gay or
lesbian.'
II. GARCIA V. ELF ATOCHEM
A. The Facts and the Holding of Garcia
Just as many of the recent same-gender sexual harassment cases have
involved male against male sexual harassment,'5 4 Garcia involved a male
supervisor harassing a male employee.'55 Freddy Garcia, an employee of
a subsidiary company of Elf Atochem North America,' 56 claimed that he
was sexually harassed by his male plant foreman. 7 Garcia alleged that on
several occasions his foreman grabbed his crotch area and made sexual
motions from behind. 58
The Court held that "[h]arassment by a male supervisor against a male
subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though the harassment
has sexual overtones."' 59 To explain its decision, the Court stated only that
"Title VII addresses gender discrimination."' 60 Although this statement
offers little by way of explanation, the Fifth Circuit's holding is resoundingly
clear: sexual harassment is not actionable if the harasser and the victim are
the same gender.

151. See cases cited supra note 120.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 120-24.
153. Ettelbrick, supra note 83, at 64 (arguing that "lesbians and gay men lack the legal
mechanism for challenging hostile and harassing speech directed against [them]" because Title
VII does not ban sexual orientation-based discrimination).
154. Smith, supra note 5, at 144.
155. Garcia v. Elf Atochen, 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
156. Id. This case also presented the Fifth Circuit with the question of "parent corporation"
and "individual" liability. Id. at 450-51. For discussion of the court's treatment of these
liability issues, see Janis van Meerveld & William J. Kelly, Labor Law, 42 LA. B.J. 480 (1995);
Labor Law Symposium, 40 LOY. L. REV. 753, 779-80 (1994).
157. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 448.

158. Id.
159. Id. at 451-52 (quoting Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993)).
160. Id.
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B. The Reasoning Behind the Garcia Holding
16
Although the Fifth Circuit did not give any reasoning for its holding,'
the Court cited and relied 6" on the reasoning of Goluszek v. Smith.'63
The plaintiff in Goluszek, Anthony Goluszek, was sexually harassed by male
co-workers.' 64 Goluszek's co-workers poked him in the buttocks with a
165
stick, asked him if he ever had intercourse or oral sex with a woman,166
ac-

cused him of being gay, and made other sexually explicit comments.
Notwithstanding the court's finding that the conduct satisfied the "butfor" test, 67 the court concluded that same-gender harassment was not the
type of conduct Congress intended to prohibit.6 6 The court found that
"[t]he discrimination Congress was concerned about when it enacted Title VII
was one stemming from an imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful which results in discrimination against a discrete and
vulnerable group. '' 169
The court reasoned that since Title VII's purpose was to eliminate

gender inequality in job opportunities, Congress only intended to prohibit
harassment which creates an "anti-male" (or "anti-female") atmosphere. 7
Since Goluszek was a male working in a male-dominated environment, the
court concluded that harassment by another male was not actionable
under
7
Title VII because it did not create an "anti-male" environment.1 '

161. The Fifth Circuit's treatment of the actionability of same-gender sexual harassment
is only one paragraph in length. Id. See also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1101 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Griffith v. Keystone Steel &
Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (C.D. Ill. 1995).
162. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52. See Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 286
(D.D.C. 1995) ("[The Fifth Circuit in Garcia, relied heavily on the influential district court
opinion in Goluszek v. Smith."). See also Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 871 F. Supp.
822, 833 (D. Md. 1994); Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545,
1550 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 525 (D.S.C. 1995); Ashworth
v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 493 (W.D. Wash. 1995). See also Smith, supra note 5, at
145.
163. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ii. 1988).
164. Id. at 1454.
165. Goluszek's co-workers "periodically asked Goluszek if he had gotten any 'pussy' or
had oral sex, [and] showed him pictures of nude women." Id.
166. Id. at 1453-54. The co-worker's told Goluszek they would get him "flicked" and
made comments to him about anal sex. Id. at 1454.
167. Id. at 1456. The court concluded that if Goluszek were a woman the harassment would
not have continued to the point of being sufficiently severe and pervasive. In other words, he
would not have been harassed but for the fact that he was male.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. It has been argued that the conclusion reached in Goluszek is incorrect because it
is inconsistent with the court's own reasoning. See Hdbert, supra note 82, at 576 (1995). This
commentator convincingly argues:
While the district court judge in Goluszek correctly perceived the nature of the
sexual harassment as an exercise of power in the workplace intended to degrade the
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In sum, according to the Garcia/Goluszek approach, Title VII was
intended to ensure equal job opportunities among men and women.'72
Thus, conduct is actionable only where there exists an atmosphere which
treats all members of one gender as inferior.'7 3
III. CRITIQUE OF THE GARCIA/GOLUSZEK APPROACH

Although other courts have adopted the "but-for" test to determine
whether the same-gender sexual harassment at issue is based on gender,'7 4
the Garcia/Goluszek approach ignores the "but-for" test when making this
determination. 7 Courts have employed the "but-for" test as a means of
measuring whether the alleged sexual harassment is the type of conduct
Congress intended to prohibit, such as the disparate treatment of women and
men. Under the "but-for" test, if the victim's gender was the "but-for" cause
of the conduct, then the conduct was the type Congress intended to prohibit.
The Garcia/Goluszek approach differs from the "but-for" test traditionally
used to resolve sexual harassment claims 7 6 because it looks solely to the
underlying concerns Congress intended to address when enacting Title VII to
determine whether the conduct at issue was based on gender.'77 Based on
the Goluszek court's interpretation of congressional intent, the Garcia/Goluszek approach concludes that same-gender sexual harassment is not
based on gender because Congress did not intend to prohibit this type of
conduct.
Instead of relying on the "but-for" test, the Garcia/Goluszek approach
relies on the Goluszek court's interpretation of the type of harassment
Congress intended to prohibit. In Goluszek, for instance, the court found that
same-gender sexual harassment is not based upon gender because prohibiting
such conduct does not further Congress' goal of eliminating disparate

harasser's target on the basis of gender, the judge incorrectly concluded that the harassment of the male plaintiff did not fit within that definition. Just because all males
in that environment were not harassed does not mean that the harassment of the
plaintiff was not based on his gender.
1d. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
172. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456. Accord Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446,
451 (5th Cir. 1994). See also Norris & Randon, supra note 90, at 245 (suggesting that Goluszek
requires the plaintiff to show that "the perpetrator is biased against everyone of the plaintiff's
sex.").
173. See Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
174. See sources cited in supra note 146.
175. See, e.g., Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456. After stating that the "requirement remains
that the plaintiff must demonstrate that but for the plaintiff's sex the plaintiff would not have
been the object of harassment" and finding that Goluszek would not have been harassed if he
were a female, the court nonetheless concluded that the harassment was not the type or conduct
Congress intended Title VII to prohibit. Id.
176. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
177. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1455-56. See also Smith, supra note 5, at 145.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1995

25

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
[V/ol. 32
California Western Law Review, Vol. 32 [1995], No. 1, Art. 5

treatment of men and women.' The court relied on this finding to conclude that Title VII does not prohibit same-gender sexual harassment because
Congress did not intend to prohibit such conduct. Accordingly, any conduct
beyond Congress' concern is not based on gender. The Goluszek court
reached this conclusion without analyzing the conduct at issue to determine
whether the harasser treated women and men differently. Thus, according to
the Garcia/Goluszekapproach,Congress did not consider same-gender sexual
harassment to be based on gender because such conduct does not constitute
disparate treatment.179 This conclusion precludes any further analysis of the
conduct at issue; same-gender sexual harassment claims are simply not
actionable.
The Garcia/Goluszekapproach's interpretation of the types of conduct
Congress intended to prohibit under Title VII is weakened by the fact that
there is little evidence of congressional intent concerning the scope of sex
discrimination under Title VII. 8 0 In light of this sparse legislative history,
other courts applied the "but-for" test for the very purpose of interpreting
which types of conduct Congress intended to prohibit.'' The Garcia/Goluszek approach, on the other hand, precludes the entire category of samegender sexual harassment from Title VII coverage based on the determination
that such conduct does not fall within the congressional concerns underlying
Title VII. However, the concerns underlying Title VII's prohibition of sex
discrimination were ambiguous from the outset. This ambiguity motivated

courts to apply the "but-for" test when determining whether certain conduct
was based on gender because the "but-for" test provided courts with a
consistent method to guide their interpretations of Title VII's intended scope.
Since the legislative history does not clearly define the scope of Title VII's
ban on sex discrimination, courts should not rely on Congress' intent alone
to refuse the entire category of same-gender sexual harassment while at the
same time recognizing cross-gender sexual harassment.
Not only is the Garcia/Goluszekapproach different than the approach
consistently applied by other courts, it inappropriately relies on the language
of Title VII to support the contention that Congress did not intend to prohibit
There are two reasons why it is inapprosame-gender sexual harassment.'
priate to rely solely on Title VII's language. First, the intent underlying the
language of Title VII is far from obvious." 3 For example, Title VII's
language concerning sex discrimination consists solely of the phrase "because
of... sex." It is arguable that the broad and undefined language indicates
that Congress intended the prohibition of sex discrimination to include any
178. Gohszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
179. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md. 1994).
180. See sources cited supra notes 40-41.
181. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Wright v.
Methodist Youth Services, 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. I111981).
182. See, e.g., Goluszek, 967 F. Supp. at 1456.
183. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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discrimination that falls under the umbrella of "sex," including same-gender
harassment. 8 4 Even though Congress may not have foreseen that members
of the same gender would harass one another, this does not necessarily mean
Congress intended to exclusively prohibit cross-gender harassment.
Second, the amount of case law interpreting the word "sex" illustrates
that Title VII's language is not clear on its face.' 85 While courts have
interpreted this phrase to mean nothing more than gender,' 86 this certainly
is not because the language of Title VII is manifest. The fact that sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII proves that the intended meaning of
"sex" is open to a broader interpretation than the Garcia/Goluszekapproach
suggests. For example, when sexual harassment was recognized as sex

discrimination, the strict biological conception of "sex" expanded to include
conduct of a sexual nature. Furthermore, the recognition of hostile environment harassment as actionable sexual harassment represents an even
further move away from the disparate treatment conception of sex discrimination.' 87 Hostile environment harassment is based on the view that
unwanted physical or verbal conduct of a sexual nature creating a hostile
atmosphere is based upon gender.' 88

184. See Marcosson, supra note 90, at 8-9. This argument is used by Marcosson with
respect to sexual orientation discrimination. Id. Marcosson argues that even though Congress
did not specifically intend to protect homosexuals from employment discrimination, if Title
VII's ban on sex discrimination is viewed more generally, sexual orientation discrimination is
covered by Title VII. Id. In support of this argument, Marcosson analogizes the interpretation
of Congress's intent concerning "sex" discrimination to that of the Framer's intent behind the
Fourteenth Amendment's ban on "race" discrimination:
[A]t a broader level of generality, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended
to bar laws using racial classifications. Antimiscegenation laws obviously do this,
bringing such laws within the sweep of the Fourteenth Amendment even if the framers did not then understand that antimiscegenation laws were included. The same is
true of Title VII: we can express Congress's intent at a level of generality to say that
it "intended" to bar employer policies using gender classifications. If we agree that
sexual orientation discrimination treats men and women differently in the same way
that antimiscegenation laws treat blacks and whites differently, then such policies
employ gender classifications, and they are barred from Title VII even if in 1964
Congress did not foresee that antigay discrimination was included.
Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
185. See cases cited supra notes 87-88, 120.
186. E.g. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding
transsexuals are not protected by Title VII because the word "sex" means no more than biological
gender); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding
Title VII's prohibition of "sex" discrimination only applies to gender discrimination, and not
to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
187. See Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1336 (D. Wyo. 1993). See
also Peirce, supra note 2, at 1098-99 (noting courts have shifted the focus of sexual harassment
away from gender-based disparate treatment towards sexually offensive conduct).
188. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1336.
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It has been argued that the recognition of sexual harassment as a form of
sex discrimination is a strained extension of the intended scope of Title
VII.8 9 However, so long as cross-gender sexual harassment continues to
be recognized under Title VII despite the criticism that sexual harassment is
not an intended form of sex discrimination, there is no basis for rejecting
same-gender sexual harassment. If the lack of Congressional intent does not
prevent recognition of cross-gender sexual harassment, the same argument
cannot be used to deny recognition of same-gender sexual harassment.
The Garcia/Goluszekapproach is also flawed insofar as sexual harassment has been recognized as sex discrimination under Title VII without a
requirement that the harassment reflect animosity towards all members of the
victim's gender. 9 ' The Garcia/Goluszekapproach shifts the emphasis in
sexual harassment cases away from the individual's gender, concentrating
instead on the individual's gender class.'
In order for harassment to violate Title VII under the Garcia/Goluszekapproach, it must create an attitude
of hostility towards all members of the victim's gender. 92 For instance,
even if a plaintiff is able to prove that the harassment would not have
occurred but for the individual's gender, such proof is not sufficient to
establish a Title VII action.193 Thus, the Garcia/Goluszekapproach insists
that Title VII requires a showing of animus towards the entire class of the
victim's gender for either same-gender or cross-gender sexual harassment to
be actionable. However, while the failure to make such a showing is used by
the Garcia/Goluszekapproach to deny same-gender sexual harassment, crossgender sexual harassment claims are recognized without expressly requiring
the plaintiff to prove that the harassment was a reflection of hatred towards
all members of the opposite sex. 9 '
Another criticism of the Garcia/Goluszek approach is that it views
Congress' concern over eliminating gender-bias as the dispositive factor in
declaring all same-gender claims non-actionable. Before Garcia,heterosexual
employees were protected from harassment imposed on them by homosexuals,
while homosexuals were not protected from harassment imposed on them by
heterosexuals.'9 5 If courts continue to adopt the Garcia/Goluszekapproach,
189. Paul, supra note 40, at 352 (arguing that sexual harassment does not fit within the
meaning of Title VII because sexual harassment is not discrimination that harms a person or
denies them a benefit based on their membership in a group despised by the discriminator);
Peirce, supranote 2, at 1094 (arguing hostile environment harassment is a strained expansion of
Title VII because sexual harassment is an individual issue rather than a gender-based issue). But
see Marcosson, supra note 90, at 38 n.43 (arguing the definition of discrimination does not
require the discriminating person to despise the target's entire group because Title VII is not
concerned with the motives behind discrimination, rather discrimination under Title VII is
concerned with compensating victims of discriminatory acts, regardless of their motive).
190. See Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1336.
191. See Norris and Randon, supra note 90, at 245.
192. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
193. See, e.g., id. at 1456. See also Norris & Randon, supra note 90, at 245.
194. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 108-13, 147-53.
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no individuals will be protected from same-gender sexual harassment.
Heterosexual victims of same-gender sexual harassment would no longer
enjoy the Title VII protection afforded them under the "but-for" test.
A final criticism of the Garcia/Goluszekapproach is the assumption that
there cannot be disparate treatment between men and women in the context
of same-gender sexual harassment. An example of this assumption lies in the
Garcia/Goluszekapproach'sinterpretation of the Supreme Court's suggestion
that harassment within the meaning of Title VII arises from the harasser's
"differentiating libido."'9 6 Based on this suggestion, the Garcia/Goluszek
approach's interpretation of disparate treatment incorrectly assumes that
disparate treatment of men and women can only occur in the cross-gender
context. For example, the Garcia/Goluszekapproach fails to recognize that
if a man imposes harassment on other men that he would not impose on
women, then he is imposing disparate treatment on men and women.
Thus, the Garcia/Goluszek approach leaps from requiring differentiating
treatment to assuming that same-gender sexual harassment is not capable of
constituting differentiating behavior. This is a glaring example of the
"heterosexual presumption"' 97 made by courts that all men and women in
cross-gender sexual harassment claims are heterosexual and that only
heterosexual behavior is differentiating. The same-gender sexual harassment
issue has exposed the prevalence of this presumption in our courts, unmasking
the heterosexism that exists in the law.
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF GARCIA
A. Courts Adopting The Garcia/GoluszekApproach
A flurry of decisions were handed down by federal district courts shortly
after Garciawas decided.' 8 A number of these courts have followed the
Garcia/Goluszek approach, holding that same-gender sexual harassment

196. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en bane), afjd on other grounds sub nom., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986). Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the same-gender sexual
harassment issue, Justice Bork used this phrase to describe the type of harassment within the
scope of Title VII. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md.
1994).
197. Leigh M. Leonard, A Missing Voice In Feminist Legal Theory: The Heterosexual
Presumption, 12 WoMiEN's RTS. L. REP. 39 (1990) (describing the "heterosexual presumption"

as taking for granted that all women and men are heterosexual which results from the
heterosexual bias that persists in the way people are socialized).
198. See Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489,493-94 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (summar-

izing the results of cases addressing the actionability of same-gender sexual harassment after
Garcia).
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claims are not actionable under Title VII. 99 The first decision to follow
2"'
Garciawas Vandeventer v. Wabash National Corporation.
In Vandeventer, a male employee brought a sexual harassment action
under Title VII against his employer based on comments made by his male
supervisor.2 ' The court agreed with the Goluszek analysis that the aim of
Title VII is to eliminate "an atmosphere of oppression by a 'dominant' gender."2 2 Despite the fact that the plaintiff was "'razzed' in a way designed
to be the most annoying to him personally-he was called a homosexual," the
court characterized the contention that there was an anti-male atmosphere as
ridiculous. 2 3 Since there was no evidence of an anti-male atmosphere, the
court concluded that the plaintiff was not harassed because he was male. 0 4
Thus,20the
court held that "[s]ame-sex harassment is not actionable under Title
5
VII.

'

On a motion to reconsider, the Vandeventer court significantly limited its
broad holding. 206 Although the plaintiff's motion to reconsider was denied
because the facts presented did not rise to an actionable level, the court spent
a considerable amount of energy explaining that its holding was "meant to be
fact-specific."20 7 The court concluded that same-gender sexual harassment
may be actionable where the plaintiff can show that he or she was the victim
of gender discrimination because there was an anti-male/female atmosphere
in the workplace.0 8 The Vandeventer court seems to suggest that it is
possible for a victim of same-gender sexual harassment to establish the
existence of an anti-male/female atmosphere, even though such a case would
be rare. 20 9 The court stated that "a man can state a claim under Title VII
for sexual harassment by another man only if he is being harassed because he
is a man; the relative genders are irrelevant. ' ' 210 While the Vandeventer
court still adheres to the Garcia/Goluszekapproachby requiring the existence

199. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 1995 WL 133349 (E.D. La.
March 24, 1995) (dismissing same-gender sexual harassment claim based on Garcia's holding);
Ashworth, 897 F. Supp. at 494; Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 526 (D.S.C. 1995)
(holding that same-gender sexual harassment is not a cognizable Title VII claim based on the
reasoning of Goluszek and Garcia); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D.
Tex. 1995); Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. at 834; Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., No. C-3-94-182, 1995
WL 386793, *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 1994).
200. 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
201. Id. at 796.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1179-82 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
207. Id. at 1179-80.
208. Id. at 1180.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1181.
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of an anti-male/female atmosphere,"' the court does not adopt the holding
that same-gender sexual harassment is never cognizable. 1 2
Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Company" was the second
reported decision to follow Garcia and hold that same-gender sexual
harassment is not actionable under Title VII. 21 4 In Hopkins, a male
employee was allegedly sexually harassed by his male supervisor.2 1 The
court held that "Title VII does not provide a cause of action for an employee
who claims to have been the victim of sexual harassment by a supervisor or
co-worker of the same gender."2 6 In accordance with the Garcia/Goluszek
approach,21 7 the court reasoned that Congress only intended to prohibit the
disparate treatment of men and women and same-gender sexual harassment
does not create disparate treatment based on gender.2" 8 The court concluded that, even though the harassment may have occurred because of the
plaintiff's gender, same-gender sexual harassment is not actionable because
29

it is not the type of conduct Congress intended Title VII to prohibit.

In addition to Vandeventer and Hopkins, several other decisions have
adopted the Garcia/Goluszekreasoning, concluding that same-gender sexual
harassment is not cognizable under Title VII. 220 While these decisions may
reflect a trend not to recognize same-gender sexual harassment under Title

211. Id. at 1182.
212. Id. at 1180. Accord Blozis v. Mike Raiser Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805, 806 (N.D.
Ind. 1995). Shortly after Vandeventer was decided, another district court ruled on the samegender sexual harassment issue in an unreported decision. Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., No. C-394-182, 1995 WL 386793 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 1994). In Fleenor,the court relied heavily on
Goluszek and concluded that "a claim of male against male hostile environment, sexual
harassment is not actionable under Title VII, in the absence of an allegation that an anti-male
environment was created thereby." Id. at *3. Fleenor and Vandeventer, therefore, adopt a
similar interpretation of the Goluszek analysis insofar as neither court is willing to make the
broad statement that same-gender sexual harassment is never actionable under Title VII.
213. 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994).
214. Id. at 834. Prior to Hopkins, the Fourth Circuit had not yet addressed this issue. Id.
215. Id. at 824. The plaintiff's supervisor subjected him to jokes, comments, and gestures
of a sexual nature. Id. For instance, while the plaintiff was in the men's room, his supervisor
walked in, pretended to lock the door, and said, "Ah, alone at last." Id. The plaintiff's Title
VII claim was based on hostile work environment sexual harassment. Id.
216. Id. at 834. In addition, the court noted that the facts were not essential to resolution
of the case because, even accepting Hopkins' version as true, no prima facie case for sex
discrimination could be established. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 833-34.
220. See cases cited supra note 199.
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VII, 22' a greater number of courts have refused to preclude same-gender

sexual harassment from Title VII's protection.222

B. Courts Refusing to Follow The Garcia/Goluszek Approach
It appeared from the cases decided immediately after Garcia that the
Fifth Circuit's decision was developing a trend to deny victims of samegender sexual harassment protection under Title VII. 223 However, since
Hopkins several courts have reached the 22
conclusion
that same-gender sexual
4

harassment is actionable under Title VII.

Prescottv. Independent Life225 was the first decision to expressly reject
the Garcia/Goluszek approach.226 In Prescott,a male employee brought a
quid pro quo sexual harassment action against his employer alleging that his
male supervisor subjected him to unwanted sexual advances.2 27 The court
stated that the harassing supervisor's gender is not relevant because quid pro
quo harassment requires only that the supervisor conditioned a term of
employment on the employee's submission to his or her sexual demands.228
Applying the "but-for" test, the court concluded that the plaintiff would not
have been subjected to the sexual advances but for his being male because a
homosexual male would not similarly harass a female.229 Based on the
facts presented, the court held that "homosexual sexual harassment" is
actionable under Title VII. 23 .

221. See Plakio v. Congregational Home, Inc., No. 93-4222-SAC, 1995 WL 317120, at *1
(D. Kan. April 27, 1995) ("If the court were to follow the current trend and rule as a matter of
law that same-gender sexual harassment is not actionable, then the court will have necessarily
decided that the plaintiff is unable to prove a prima facie case of sexual harassment.").
222. See, e.g., Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550
(M.D. Ala. 1995); Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., No. Civ.A.93-2351, 1995
\VL 241855, at *2 (E.D. La. April 25, 1995); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp.
1133, 1136 (C.D. Ill. 1995); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 286-88 (D.D.C.
1995); Roe v. K-Mart Corp., No. Civ.A.2:93-2372-18AJ, 1995 WL 316783, at *1 (D.S.C. March
28, 1995); McKoy v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga.
1995); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103
(M.D. Tenn. 1995); Nogueras v. University of Puerto Rico, 890 F. Supp. 60, 63 (D.P.R.
1995).
223. Berenkritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 525 (D.S.C. 1995) ("Most reported opinions
appear to be following [Garcia's] finding."). See, e.g., Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp.,
867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994); Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. at 834; Myers v. City of El Paso,
874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (1995).
224. See cases cited supra note 222.
225. 878 F. Supp. 1545 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
226. Id. at 1550.
227. Id. at 1547-48.
228. Id. at 1550. Accord Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (C.D.
Ill. 1995).
229. Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1550-51.
230. Id. at 1551. Accord Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala.
1983); Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. III. 1981).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol32/iss1/5

32

1995]

SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII

Wehren: Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Under Title VII: Garcia v. Elf Atoc

The Prescott court interpreted the Garcia/Goluszekapproach as being
concerned with remedying the problem of a powerless group being disadvantaged by the dominant group.231 To refute the Garcia/Goluszek approach,
the court stated:
While this argument may be logically appealing, it is not the current
state of anti-discrimination jurisprudence. If it were, a similar argument
could be made when a white plaintiff attempts to sue for reverse discrimination under Title VII. That white plaintiff would have been at all times
a member of the majority, a member of the "dominant" race. However, the
Supreme Court "has consistently interpreted Title VII to proscribe racial
discrimination in private employment against whites on the same terms as
232
racial discrimination against nonwhites ...
The Prescott court also found the Garcia/Goluszek approach to be
inconsistent with the language and intent of Title V11 233 because Congress'
use of the gender-neutral and unmodified term "sex" indicates that Congress
intended Title VII to prohibit same-gender sexual harassment. 3 1 The court
reasoned that if Congress intended for Title VII merely to prohibit crosseasily have done so by using the term
gender sexual harassment, it could
"member of the opposite sex. 2 3 Thus, Title VII's plain language does
not limit the scope of its prohibition to employees of the opposite sex.236
Relying on many of the same reasons cited in Prescott, in Griffith v.
Keystone Steel and Wire,237 the district court for the Eastern District of
Illinois held that same-gender sexual harassment is actionable under Title
VII. 23s The Griffith court offered an additional argument to reject the
Garcia/Goluszek approach's requirement of an anti-male/female atmosphere.2 39 To refute the Goluszek reasoning that an employee cannot
establish an atmosphere of oppression where the employee is a male in a
male-dominated environment, the court stated that "while the number of male

231. Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1550.
232. Id. (quoting McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279
(1976)). Accord Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995) ("[I]t
cannot be denied that even if the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is silent as to its intended scope, the
law's breadth has since increased by judicial interpretation."); Equal Opportunity Employment
Comm'n, v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (stating that the
requirements for proving a prima facie case should be modified to accommodate the same-gender
discrimination context because it would be untenable to prohibit reverse discrimination while at
the same time refuse to prohibit same-gender sexual harassment).
233. Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1550 n.5.
234. Id. at 1550.
235. Id.
236. Id. Accord Nogueras v. University of Puerto Rico, 890 F. Supp. 60, 63 (D.P.R. 1995);
Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (C.D. Ill. 1995); Walden Book, 885
F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
237. 887 F. Supp. 1133 (C.D. Ill. 1995).
238. Id. at 1136-37.
239. Id. at 1137.
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and female workers in a work environment may be relevant in assessing the
impact of sexual harassment, such a showing is not essential to prevail." 2 40
One of the most interesting opinions rejecting the Garcia/Goluszek
approach is Pritchettv. Sizeler Real Estate Management Company,2"4' which
was decided by a district court in the Fifth Circuit. Pritchett involved an
allegation that a female employee was sexually harassed by her female
supervisor.24 2 The Pritchett court circumvented Garcia by characterizing
the Fifth Circuit's treatment of the same-gender sexual harassment issue as
243
dicta because the court decided the case on employer liability grounds.
Refusing to adopt Garcia, the court chose instead to apply the "but-for"
test.244 The court held that same-gender sexual harassment is a form of
gender discrimination under Title VII because, but for her being female, the
employee would not have been harassed.245
The Pritchett court felt it was unfair to deny same-gender sexual
harassment under Title VII because this would allow homosexuals to be
exempt from the very laws that govern the conduct of heterosexuals in the
workplace. 246 Thus, the actual motivation behind the court's conclusion is
the fear that if same-gender sexual harassment is not actionable, heterosexuals
would not be protected from homosexual harassers in the workplace.
Although the court reaches the proper result, the court's motivation is
heterosexist because it is not concerned in the least with the unfairness of not
protecting homosexuals from discrimination based on sexual orientation.247
C. Does Garcia Reflect A Trend Not To Recognize Same-Gender
Sexual Harassment Under Title VII?
Federal district courts look to Garciawhen confronted with same-gender
sexual harassment claims because it remains the only appellate decision to
answer the question of whether same-gender sexual harassment is actionable
under Title VII. 248 The aftermath of Garciahas produced a split among the
federal district courts, 249 which makes it difficult to predict the outcome of
same-gender sexual harassment claims in the future. The Vandeventer
court's treatment of the issue best illustrates the difficulty of predicting the
240. Id.
241. No. Civ.A.93-2351, 1995 WL 241855 (E.D. La. April 25, 1995).
242. Id. at *1.
243. Id. at *2. But see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, No. Civ.A.94-1483, 1995
WL 133349, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 1995) (concluding that Garcia'streatment of the samegender sexual harassment issue is not dicta and represents a "clear directive" that Title VII does
not prohibit male against male sexual harassment).
244. Pritchett, No. Civ.A.93-2351, 1995 WL at *2.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See cases cited supra note 14.
249. Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 492 (W.D. Wash. 1995).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol32/iss1/5

34

1995]

SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII
121
Wehren: Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Under Title VII: Garcia v. Elf Atoc

actionability of same-gender sexual harassment in the future. For instance,
even though Vandeventer adopted the Garcia/Goluszekapproach, the court
refused to accept the broad holding established by Garciathat same-gender
sexual harassment is never actionable.250
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit, while not deciding the issue, stated in
dicta that "sexual harassment of women by men is the most common kind,
but we do not mean to exclude the possibilitythat sexual harassment of men
by women, or men by other men, or women by other women would not also
be actionable in appropriate cases.""25 This dicta strongly suggests that if
the Seventh Circuit addresses this issue, it will find same-gender sexual
harassment actionable under Title VII. If this were to occur, district courts
would be left with two Circuit Court opinions that are completely at odds
with each other. Undoubtedly, this would create further controversy and
confusion in this area of the law.
In sum, in light of the fact that some, though not all, courts are following
Garcia,the decision has potential to establish a trend to refuse an action for
same-gender sexual harassment under Title VII. Until the United States
Supreme Court rules on the issue or Congress amends Title VII to be more
specific in its application, Garciawill continue to have an impact on courts
deciding whether or not same-gender sexual harassment is actionable.
IV. A BETTER APPROACH TO RECOGNIZING SAME-GENDER
SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII
A. Approaches That Fail To Recognize An Action Under Title VII For
Same-gender Sexual Harassment
Three different justifications have been used to deny an action under
Title VII for same-gender sexual harassment. First, same-gender sexual
harassment claims involving a bisexual or equal opportunity harasser have
been denied because courts do not deem such conduct to satisfy the "but-for"
test.252 According to this theory, in order to establish that the conduct
constitutes discrimination "because of.. . sex," the plaintiff must show that,
but for his or her gender, the harassment would not have occurred.253
Application of the "but-for" test has resulted in recognition of an action
under Title VII in all situations, including the same-gender context, except for
two: (1) where a bisexual is the harasser; and (2) where the harassment,
regardless of the sexual orientation of the harasser, is directed at both men

250. See supra text accompanying notes 208-12.
251. Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 97-105.
253. See, e.g., Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (C.D. 11. 1995);
Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550-51 (M.D. Ala. 1995);
Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala. 1983); Wright v. Methodist
Youth Services, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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and women.254 According to these cases, a claim brought against a person
of the same gender is actionable under the "but for" test, unless it falls within
one of the exceptions.
Where the "but-for" test fails is in its reliance on sexual orientation to
determine if conduct is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.
The "but for" analysis fails to recognize the entire spectrum of possible
scenarios and allows courts to interject the sexual orientation of the victim or
the harasser to determine whether a same-gender claim is actionable.255
Although application of the "but-for" test has lead to inconsistent and
underinclusive results, 256 it at least recognizes the disparate impact of sexual
harassment even when it is among persons of the same gender.
The second justification used to deny an action for same-gender sexual
harassment, is that the conduct merely amounts to sexual orientation
discrimination. Some courts have refused to recognize harassment directed
at homosexuals as valid hostile environment harassment 7 on the theory
that the harassment was merely sexual orientation discrimination. 2 8 This
approach rests on the assertion that harassment of a homosexual, even if it is
sexual in nature, is permissible discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, as opposed to impermissible gender-based discrimination. 5
The third justification used to deny same-gender sexual harassment
actions under Title VII is that Congress simply did not intend to prohibit
members of the same gender from sexually harassing each other. 26 1 This
justification is manifested in the Garcia/Goluszekapproach, which rests on
the assertion that Congress was only concerned with the disparate treatment
between men and women.2 6' Accordingly, if the harasser and the victim
are the same gender, then the conduct does not involve disparate treatment.262
B. The Better Approach
Sexual harassment constitutes an action under Title VII where the
conduct is based on the victim's gender.263 When determining whether the
conduct involved in a sexual harassment claim is based on gender, courts
should not look to the respective gender of the harasser and the victim. The

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
1994).
263.

See supra text accompanying notes 146-50.
See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
See supra text accompanying notes 94-96, 147-50.
See, e.g., Dillon v. Frank, No. 92-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
See supra text accompanying notes 120-24.
See supra text accompanying notes 130-34.
See supra text accompanying notes 168-73.
See Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1455-56 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
See, e.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md.
See supra text accompanying notes 63-65, 77.
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gender of the harasser with respect to the victim is irrelevant because it is the
nature of the harasser's actions, not the motivation behind them, that gives
rise to discrimination based on gender. Accordingly, courts should focus on
whether the harassment is sexual in nature because sexual conduct is
necessarily based on the victim's gender, regardless of the harasser's
gender.264 Thus, as long as the alleged conduct is sexual in nature, samegender sexual harassment should be actionable under Title VII.
Furthermore, the sexual orientation of the victim should not change the
fact that conduct that is sexual in nature is based on gender. It is incorrect
to conclude that harassment against a person based on his or her actual or
perceived homosexuality is not based on the person's gender.265 There are
two reasons why it is erroneous to conclude that sexual orientation discrimination is not based on gender.
First, an individual's gender cannot be separated from her or his
sexuality. Since sexual harassment is inherently tied to sexuality, 26 6 and a
person's gender and sexuality cannot be separated, sexual harassment is
necessarily based on a person's gender. Similarly, a person's gender cannot
be separated from determining his or her sexual orientation. 267 A human
being who sexually desires men is labeled a particular sexual orientation
based on his or her gender. If the human being is a man, then he is homosexual. If the human being is a woman, she is heterosexual. Thus, a
person's sexual orientation cannot be determined unless we know his or her
gender and to which gender he or she is attracted.
The failure to recognize that harassment against homosexuals is based
upon gender strips homosexuals of their gender identity. If a homosexual is
subjected to harassment in the form of sexually charged attacks against her
or his homosexuality, the harassment is found merely to be a result of the
person's homosexuality and hence had nothing to do with the person's
gender. Such a finding results from the manner in which courts have
confined "sex" to mean biological gender, rather than allowing it to
encompass the broader meaning of gender.

264. See Hdbert, supra note 82, at 568 ("Sexual harassment is gender harassment.").
265. See Arriola, supra note 120, at 118 (citations omitted).
Traditional models of analysis do not recognize claims of anti-gay or antilesbian sexism. This lack of recognition results from the ways in which traditional
analysis defines and arranges categories, arbitrarily splitting apart "sex" and "gender"
from "sexuality" or "sexual orientation." ... In contrast, feminist theory and jurisprudence have failed to fully explore the relationship between gender discrimination and
anti-homosexuality. Consequently, most courts assume that gender has little to do
with lesbian or gay discrimination.
Id.
266. Marcosson, supra note 90, at 32.
267. Valdes, supra note 36, at 19 ("[S]exual orientation discrimination plays a key role in
the perpetuation of sex and gender discrimination precisely because sex-determined gender plays
a key role in the construction of sexual orientation.").
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If a court is applying the "but-for" test, it should take into consideration
other aspects of gender, such as gender stereotypes, especially those
concerning appropriate sexual conduct. In our society, for example, every
person is presumed to be heterosexual and those who do not conform to
heterosexual norms are punished.268
Heterosexual norms dictate the
assumption that sexual attraction occurs only in the cross-gender context.
Same-gender sexual desire is thought to be unrelated to gender because of the
heterosexist gender stereotypes regarding appropriate sexual conduct. Thus,
attraction to a person of the same gender is explained away as a "sexual
orientation" issue.269
A liberal view of gender within the meaning of Title VII includes gender
stereotypes.2 7 Gender stereotypes dictate what is viewed as appropriate
behavior for men and women. If the "but-for" test is applied according to
this more liberal construction of gender, sexual harassment against homosexuals is prohibited under Title VII. Because harassment against homosexuals
involving sexual conduct or comments reinforces gender stereotypes of appropriate gender roles, especially proper sexual roles, such harassment is based
on gender.27' Thus, harassment against homosexuals should be prohibited
by Title VII's ban on sex discrimination.
The second reason why it is incorrect to conclude that sexual orientation
discrimination is not based on gender is that as long as the harassment
involves sexual conduct, it should be considered to be based on the victim's
gender.272 Taking each type of harassment separately, quid pro quo harassment directed at a homosexual is by definition conduct of a sexual nature,
thus it is based on gender. Hostile environment harassment against an actual
or perceived homosexual is also based on gender when it involves sexual
conduct, even if the harassment can also be characterized as sexual orientation
discrimination.
For example, consider the situation of a homosexual man who is harassed
by co-workers with comments such as "Dillon sucks dicks.""27 Not only

268. See Leonard, supranote 196, at 43.
269. Arriola, supra note 120, at 116 (1994).
Gay sexuality is typically cast in opposition to the sexual norm of a heterosexuallydominant culture. Consequently, homosexuality can conveniently be cast as falling
outside of the paradigm that encourages a court to rule, for example, that antilesbianism unfairly strikes at the core of a woman's gender identity.

Id. (citations omitted).
270. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-52 (1989).
271. See id. at 250.
272. See Marcosson, supra note 90, at 3 (arguing that courts have defined hostile
environment sexual harassment according to the sexual nature of the conduct, rather than the
gender of the victim, thus sexual orientation harassment is indistinguishable from gender-based
harassment because sexual orientation harassment is sexual in nature for sexuality is inherent in
all cases of sexual harassment).
273. Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
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is the comment based on a hatred of homosexuality that is properly labeled
sexual orientation discrimination, but it is also sexual in nature, thus
constituting gender-based discrimination.274 Even where harassment is
based on sexual orientation, same-gender sexual harassment should be
actionable because whenever a person is subjected to attacks that involve
sexual content, the harassment is based on the victim's gender.
While it is necessary to consider the victim's sexual orientation when the
conduct at issue involves attacks against a person's actual or perceived
homosexuality, the harasser's sexual orientation is irrelevant in determining
the actionability of any type of sexual harassment claim. The sexual
orientation of the harasser should not be considered because it is only relevant
that the victim was subjected to conduct of a sexual nature.27 Whether or
not the harassment is based on gender depends on the nature of the harasser's actions. Looking to the harasser's sexual orientation as a factor in
determining whether the conduct is based on gender inappropriately focuses
on the motivation of the harasser's actions. Moreover, an individual is not
necessarily motivated by their sexual orientation when they target another
person for sexual harassment.276
2 77 offers an example of an
Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corporation,
approach that does not look to the sexual orientation of the harasser or the
victim as a dispositive factor. In Chiapuzio, the "but-for" test did not
preclude a same-gender action where harassment was directed at both women
and men. 8 Chiapuzio is the better approach because the court recognized
the claim without using the harasser's sexual orientation as a factor, which,
under the "but-for" test would have precluded the action were the harasser
bisexual.
In sum, sexual orientation should be a factor in determining the
actionability of same-gender sexual harassment only where the claim involves
274. Marcosson, supra note 90, at 27-28.
[S]exually offensive conduct is "because of. .. sex," and thus constitutes sexual
harassment under Title VII. Some will argue that such an extension rips the principle
from its statutory anchor, making it more vulnerable to being sunk in a conservative
judicial sea. In my judgment, however, it is hypocritical to allow Title VII
harassment claims against offensive conduct that is undirected at anyone, or, if
directed, not because of the gender of the specific target simply because the conduct
is sexual in nature, and then spin around and not allow a claim regarding conduct that
is equally sexual in nature, but happens to be directed at someone because of his or
her sexual orientation. If the sexual character of the harassment provides the link to
gender, it should do so in both cases.
Id.
275. Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 120 (2d. Dist. 1993) (interpreting
a California statute similar to Title VII to provide an action for same-gender sexual harassment
regardless of the harasser's sexual orientation).
276. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97
HARV. L. REv. 1449, 1451 (1984).
277. 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993).
278. Id. at 1336.
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attacks against the victim's actual or perceived homosexuality. Furthermore,
in such cases of alleged attacks against an employee's sexual orientation, it
is only the victim's, not the harasser's, sexual orientation that is relevant.
The harasser's sexual orientation should not be used as a factor in determining the actionability of same-gender sexual harassment because the harasser's
sexual orientation speaks only to the motivation behind the acts, not to the
nature of the acts. In the same-gender context, sexual orientation should not
preclude finding actionable sexual harassment under Title VII. Whether a
Title VII claim can be brought against a person of the same gender should
not be supported by the fact that the harasser is homosexual and should not
be precluded if the victim is or is perceived to be homosexual.
CONCLUSION

The most convincing extension of Title VII to same-gender sexual
harassment claims is through legislative action. Only then would the
application of Title VII to same-gender sexual harassment truly speak to the
legislative intent. However, until Congress amends Title VII to expressly
include same-gender sexual harassment and as long as Garciaremains the
only appellate decision to address the issue, the door is open for courts to
reject same-gender claims. The anomaly created by rejecting same-gender
sexual harassment under Title VII and refusing to extend Title VII protection
to sexual orientation discrimination while at the same time recognizing crossgender sexual harassment claims illustrates the unfairness inherent in the
judicial interpretations of sex discrimination under Title VII. This unfairness
offers strong support in favor of recognizing same-gender sexual harassment
under Title VII. Ideally, Congress would recognize this by way of legislative
action.
Nonetheless, it should be judicially recognized that Title VII prohibits
same-gender sexual harassment because it involves conduct that is based on
gender. Moreover, when determining whether same-gender sexual harassment
is actionable, courts should focus on the nature of the conduct. The relevant
question should be whether the conduct involves conduct of a sexual nature
because harassment involving sexual conduct is based on gender. Thus, when
assessing whether same-gender sexual harassment constitutes actionable sex
discrimination under Title VII, it is unnecessary to focus either on the
motivation behind the harassment or on the respective genders of the harasser
and the victim. Since the motivation of the conduct is irrelevant, it is also
unnecessary to consider the harasser's sexual orientation as a factor in
determining if same-gender sexual harassment is actionable.
The underlying problem of sexual harassment is that of employees being
subjected to sexual exploitation at work. Sexual harassment is about power
and it involves using sexuality as leverage against another person. 279 No

279. See Avner, supra note 115 at 58.
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person should be forced to tolerate such exploitation, regardless of the
harasser's gender with respect to his or her victim's gender. An employee
subjected to discrimination in the form of sexually harassing behavior should
not be denied Title VII protection because her or his harasser is the same
gender. Same-gender sexual harassment involves the same type of discriminatory conduct as cross-gender sexual harassment, which is actionable under
Title VII because it constitutes discrimination based on gender. 281 Similarly, same-gender sexual harassment should be actionable under Title VII.
As long as courts continue to recognize cross-gender sexual harassment
claims, a victim of the same offensive, hostile, or abusive conduct must not
be precluded from bringing an action simply because his or her harasser is the
same gender. The fact that the harasser and the victim are both men or both
women should not preclude an action for sexual harassment under Title VII
because sexual conduct necessarily involves the victim's gender. Regardless
of whether the harasser is the same or opposite gender as the victim,
harassment involving conduct of a sexual nature, under either a quid pro quo
or hostile work environment theory, constitutes sex discrimination under Title
VII because such conduct is based on the victim's gender.
Lisa Wehren"

280. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
B.A., 1993, San Jose State University; J.D. Candidate, 1996, California Western School of
Law. The author vould like to thank Professor Barbara Cox for her comments and encouragement and Todd Kennedy for his editing assistance. Special thanks to my family and friends for
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